Section Tactics — Two-versus-One

"Section" is the term used to describe a team of two fighters acting in concert against the adversary. This concept was first employed early in World War I by the Germans Oswald Boelcke and Max Immelmann. Even in the infancy of air combat, it was readily apparent that one-versus-one engage ment has serious flaws in practical application. Among these failings is inadequate defense against surprise attack by an unseen opponent. It has been estimated that throughout the history of air combat 80 to 90 percent of downed fighter pilots were unaware of their danger until the moment of the attack. Suprise, then, and, conversely, the avoidance of surprise, must be considered the most vital element in air combat.

Most aircraft, and particularly single-seat fighters, have blind spots that cannot be monitored visually on a continuous basis by the pilot. The underside of the aircraft and the rear hemisphere are usually the most troublesome areas. Although these regions can be checked sporadically by rolling and turning the aircraft, this technique may not be adequate against an attacker with high closure. Additionally, one-versus-one combat, and particularly weapons employment during combat, demands that the pilot's full attention be devoted to the opponent he sees, leaving little or no opportunity for him to defend against a second attack.

In theory, the operation of two fighters together can alleviate this problem by allowing each of the two pilots to cover the blind zone of the other before an engagement and by allowing one pilot to prosecute an attack confident in the knowledge that his vulnerable areas are being protected by his wingman. A fallout of this strategy is the old military principle of concentration of forces, as greater firepower can be brought to bear on the adversary.

Although this principle of "mutual support" sounds straightforward enough, it has given rise to a multitude of tactical doctrines designed to exploit its advantages. Most of these doctrines have been successful to some degree under certain combat conditions. Three of the most common are discussed here, but it should be recognized that there may be many tactical variations within each broad doctrine, all of which, obviously, cannot be covered in detail.

Fighting Wing

Fighting wing tactics, sometimes called "welded wing," designate a leader and a wingman. The leader's primary responsibilities are navigation, for ward-hemisphere search for the enemy, attack planning, and engaged maneuvering, and he has a secondary responsibility of rear-hemisphere visual coverage. The wingman flies a rather loose formation on the leader; his primary task is maintaining a rear-hemisphere defensive lookout, and he has secondary forward-hemisphere duties.

The fighters could even choose to cruise in "trail," one directly behind the other, a formation also known as "line astern." Separation between aircraft in these cruise formations typically has varied from one extreme to the other, between the minimum and maximum ranges outlined here. The wingman is usually "stepped-down" (i.e., lower in altitude) a few feet, which makes it easier for him to stay out of the way should the leader decide to turn sharply toward the wingman. During the biplane days, stepping-up was common because of better wingman visibil ity looking forward and down. The merits and shortcomings of each of these pre-engaged tactical formations are discussed in a later chapter. Suffice it to say here that echelon is probably the tactical formation most widely used in conjunction with fighting wing, but that line abreast is probably better, since this arrangement offers each pilot an equal view of the other's rear hemisphere. The difficulty with line abreast is that the wingman is initially forward of the prescribed fighting wing position and may not be able to regain it in the event of unexpected heavy maneuvering.

Engaged Maneuvering

Once the engagement begins, the fighting wing leader essentially fights the opponent one-versus-one, while the wingman hangs on for dear life. The wingman should attempt to maintain a position as far off the leader's tail as practical to give himself the best possible view of the leader's vulnerable rear hemisphere and to afford the leader the chance to check the wingman's six o'clock. Within limits, greater separation between fighters also provides for better visual coverage and quicker support by the wing man should the leader be attacked. In general, however, the greater the aircraft separation and the farther forward the wingman flies, the more difficult the task of maintaining the position. A great deal of practice, therefore, is required to produce an effective fighting wing wingman.

In addition to improved defensive coverage, fighting wing tactics have several other advantages as compared with operating as a single aircraft in a combat environment. One of the greatest pluses is that it takes much less training for a pilot to fly fighting wing well enough to stay with his leader than it takes to enable that pilot to survive on his own. Trained fighter pilots are almost always in short supply during wartime, and fighting wing allows inexperienced pilots to engage in combat under the tutelage of a veteran leader at reduced risk. Actual combat is the best teacher, but historically the highest attrition rate for fighter pilots has occurred during their first few combat missions. Fighting wing can get the fresh recruit through this vulnerable period while he is serving the useful function of offering some visual support to the leader. A second set of eyeballs can be invaluable in the combat environment.

The other major advantage of fighting wing is concentration of fire. The lead is essentially maneuvering two firing platforms rather than just one. Under the ground rules of fighting wing it is the wingman's responsibility to stay with and cover his lead, not to engage the bogey. Any attention paid to the opponent detracts from the wingman's defensive potential. Against most maneuvering fighter opponents, when concentration of fire is not critical and shot opportunities are likely to be fleeting, the leader usually will do all the shooting. But quite often an enemy fighter's defensive reaction to the leader's attack sets up a shot for the wingman. Against heavily armored, nonmaneuvering targets, especially bombers, the lead may clear the wingman to iire, either simultaneously or in rapid succes sion, to make best use of all available firepower. The wingman may also be allowed to finish off a defeated or crippled opponent as an effective means of building confidence and combat weapons-firing experience. In this case the lead clears his wingman to attack and temporarily assumes the duties and position of wingman himself. In the case of a relatively experienced wingman, there may be a pre-engagement agreement between team mem bers that the wingman may attack any bogey he sees first, and assume the temporary lead. As a rule, however, the wingman should attempt to get the leader's eyes on the bogey and let him decide whether and how to attack. Obviously, if the leader is threatened severely by an attacker, it is the wingman's duty to warn the leader and counterattack immediately.

Another scenario in which fighting wing provides concentration of fire is with multi-crew fighters having rear-hemisphere weapons. The close spacing between aircraft makes it difficult for an attacker to bounce one fighter without coming under fire from both. This also accounts for some of the logic behind close bomber formations

Analysis of Fighting Wing Doctrine

In addition to its obvious benefits, fighting wing doctrine has some serious flaws. With the exception of the pre-engagement line-abreast formation, the wingman's position behind the leader results in reduced visual cover age of the wingman's six. Moreover, once is he engaged, the lead is likely to be too busy with the bogey to provide adequate support to his wingman in any event. Although the wingman is theoretically burdened only with defensive lookout responsibility, in practice he is so occupied by maintain ing position during hard maneuvering that he may be of little defensive value to either the leader or himself. In this case he is literally "hung out to dry." Many a wingman has been lost without the leader even being aware of it.

Lack of offensive efficiency is also a serious problem with this doctrine. The bogey pilot is essentially fighting only one opponent. Having one of his adversaries in sight virtually assures having the other in sight. From an offensive point of view the fighting wing leader must engage the opponent one-versus-one. If his aircraft is superior to the bogey, this may be practi cal, but he clearly cannot hope to defeat a better fighter that is well flown unless the bogey can be taken by surprise. Even this is more difficult with two aircraft rather than one, since the section is more visible.

Neither is fighting wing compatible with most energy tactics. As de tailed previously, most of these methods require the energy fighter to trade position advantage for an energy margin, then convert that energy to a position advantage with a zoom climb. Although the leader of a fighting wing section may be capable of pulling this off safely, the zoom often leaves the wingman behind, below, and very vulnerable. Angles tactics are much more appropriate for fighting wing, but they are not likely to bring success unless the section fighters have a turn-performance advantage over their adversary. If this is not the case, the section may be forced to resort to hit-and-run methods, but under some circumstances (e.g., when the section aircraft have a large energy advantage over a bogey that is not all-aspect missile equipped) extension/pitch-back tactics may be work able. A considerable T/W advantage (or initial energy advantage) usually is required for this method, since the leader is generally restricted to partial power for benefit of the wingman. Otherwise the wingman would have a difficult time keeping up during the extensions and zooms.

Even with its many failings fighting wing has survived from early World War I right up to the most recent air combats, and it probably will continue to find applications as long as manned fighters exist. In most cases it is still superior to engaging one-versus-one in a hostile combat environment.

Double Attack

Double attack, also known by many other names, is a system by which each aircraft of a pair of fighters can support the other without remaining in the rigid structure prescribed by fighting wing. This doctrine permits the section to split, allowing for coordinated, sequential attacks. There is still a leader and a wingman in this method, but the relationship can change back and forth during an engagement.

Pre-Engagement Considerations

Pre-engagement formations used with double attack doctrine are generally the same as with fighting wing (echelon, line astern, or line abreast), except that aircraft separation can be increased somewhat since there is no longer a requirement for the wingman to remain closely behind his leader once the section is engaged. Greater separation between fighters can provide better visual coverage of the teammate's rear hemisphere, allows the fighters more maneuvering room to counterattack a bogey that may attack the other fighter, and makes it more difficult for a single bogey to see or attack both fighters simultaneously.

The ideal separation between fighters using double attack doctrine depends on several factors, one of which is the turning radius of the aircraft involved. It does little good for the wingman to detect an attack on his partner if something cannot be done about the situation quickly. In addi tion to warning the threatened pilot to take evasive action, the wingman should be able to bring offensive pressure to bear on the attacker in minimum time. In general, this task is easiest when separation between fighters is on the order of one or two turn radii, since this gives the wingman maneuvering room to turn and point weapons at the attacker. This maneuvering space is often not available in close fighting wing formations. Obviously, optimum lateral spacing will vary with turn ra dius, as this performance parameter varies with fighter speed and altitude.

The maximum firing range of the enemy's weapons, particularly AAMs, can vary substantially depending on altitude, fighter speed, bogey closure, etc. These factors may, therefore, need to be taken into consideration by the defending pilots. Generally speaking, higher altitudes and slower speeds require greater separation between fighters if a bogey is to be denied an AAM firing opportunity within the section's danger zone. Typical separation between fighters in combat spread in a modern AAM environ ment is on the order of one to two miles.

The physical size of the aircraft involved also plays an important part in determining the optimum section spacing. While minimum separation is largely dependent on turn radius, field of view, and weapons considera tions, maximum split is limited by aircraft size and visibility conditions. The fighters need to remain close enough together for there to be little danger of them losing sight of each other under prevailing visibility condi tions. When approaching the limits of this range, each pilot must spend more and more time watching his teammate, which leaves less time for offensive or defensive scanning. Unless the enemy fighters are consider ably larger than the friendlies, bogey size is often a more restrictive factor than the size of the section's aircraft. As a bogey approaches firing range within the blind cone of one fighter, range from the bogey to the target's wingman may be considerably greater than the separation between fighters. Fighter spacing, therefore, must be restricted to provide reason able assurance that an enemy approaching firing parameters on one fighter will be detected by the other.

Under many conditions of visibility, bogey size, and weapons ranges, maximum allowable separation between fighters may be less than that required to ensure that the enemy cannot fire within the section's danger zone. Under such circumstances, high speed and low altitude may restrict the bogey's AAM firing envelope sufficiently to solve the problem. Allow ing the fighters to weave may also help by effectively reducing the size of the blind cones. Weaving, however, makes fighters more detectable be cause of the increased probability of sun reflections off various parts of the aircraft catching the enemy's attention. Weaving also slows a section's forward progress, which may allow a slower bogey to close from the rear.

Optimum vertical separation between fighters in section is determined by environmental, performance, and aircraft structural design factors. For instance, the wingman would not want to be stepped-up on the sun side of his leader, since the leader's vision would be impaired as he looked into the sun to check the wingman's rear hemisphere. The wingman would nor mally step up when he is on the leader's down-sun side and fly below the leader when he is up-sun of the leader.

Large vertical separations between fighters can reduce defensive capa bility, since the lower aircraft may not be able to climb up quickly to the level of the wingman to render assistance without losing so much airspeed that it becomes ineffective. Higher performance fighters can, therefore, afford larger altitude splits.

Aircraft structural design enters the picture because of its effect on cockpit field of view. A modern low-wing fighter, for instance, often has a more restricted field of view behind and down because of the obstruction of the wing. If one fighter is stepped-up in this case, its wing might obscure a large portion of the wingman's rear hemisphere. When necessary this problem may be alleviated by rolling the aircraft periodically to check the hidden region, but generally it is better to avoid the problem altogether by readjusting relative aircraft altitudes.

In general, within the limits described, larger splits, both horizontally and vertically, provide better offensive potential. This is partially because greater separation affords more maneuvering flexibility and partially be cause enemy fighters are less likely to see both aircraft simultaneously. However, this improved offensive potential may be gained at the cost of reduced defensive capability, because of visibility and performance fac tors. Usually the prudent section will opt for splits nearer the minimum limits in high-threat areas, or when the immediate chances of engaging offensively are slim. Wider splits are more appropriate in low-threat condi tions and in the final stages of an offensive attack.

Engaged Maneuvering

It is in the engaged phase that double attack departs most dramatically from fighting wing doctrine. For example, when the enemy is spotted by the wingman, no time is wasted getting the leader's eyes on the target. If the wingman is in a favorable position and he considers attack to be advisable, he assumes the lead and attacks. The new wingman positions to cover his teammate, usually high above the fight. Since the wingman is relieved of his close-formation requirement, he can devote full attention to the more important task of providing effective visual coverage. His ma neuvering requirements are also reduced, so the wingman can use this opportunity to increase his energy level, making him more effective in case he later becomes engaged.

Once the section has split, there is a subtle shift from the leader/ wingman relationship between pilots to an engaged fighter-free fighter relationship. The pilot of the engaged fighter is the one more closely involved with the adversary. In essence, he is the section leader at that moment. The first duty of the engaged fighter in offensive double attack is to press the attack. The result of this attempt will be either destruction of the target or loss of the offensive. At the first sign that the offensive is being lost (i.e., impending overshoot, energy depletion, etc.), the engaged-fighter pilot should disengage immediately and call in the wingman to assume the offensive. The engaged fighter—free fighter roles then reverse, and the new free-fighter pilot assumes the duties of visual coverage and replenishment of his expended energy until he is called once again into the fight by the engaged pilot.

To be most effective, the pilot of the double attack free fighter needs to keep the engaged fighter in sight and stay close enough to offer adequate visual support and quick response to an attack on his teammate without getting in the way. In order for the pilot of the free fighter to provide the quickest defensive reaction potential, he must maintain high energy (pref erably higher than that of the engaged fighter), minimize separation from the fight, and avoid letting the fight get too far behind his wing-line. Probably the most effective technique for meeting all these parameters is to maneuver in a plane perpendicular to that of the fight. For instance, if the bogey and the engaged fighter are making essentially level turns, the free-fighter pilot can perform a series of vertical or very steep oblique loops around the fight. He can also use a series of high and low yo-yos. Con versely, if the fight is progressing vertically, the free fighter can arc around the fight in level turns. In this way the free fighter stays close to the fight and can keep the engaged fighter within about 90° of the nose for a quicker defensive response. This is especially important for slow-turning fighters. In addition, the free fighter's turn rate is "decoupled" from the fight in this manner. This means the fight itself may be allowed to go through two or three turns while the free fighter completes just one revolution in a perpen dicular plane. The free fighter can therefore hold lower G and build an energy reserve for future offensive or defensive maneuvering.

Analysis of the Double Attack Doctrine

Double attack allows two fighters to split for better mutual support. There are still a leader and a wingman, as in fighting wing, but these roles are allowed to change back and forth during an engagement as the situation warrants. After the engagement begins, the leader/wingman relationship becomes one of engaged fighter-free fighter. Offensively, after the initial attack, which can be made by both fighters simultaneously or in rapid succession, the fighter with the greatest offensive potential becomes the engaged fighter and commences one-versus-one maneuvering while the free fighter assumes a cover position. The duties of the free-fighter pilot are to remain in the general area and maintain a visual lookout for other hostile aircraft, but he is not tied rigidly to the engaged fighter, as he is in fighting wing. The engaged-fighter pilot's responsibility is to attack and destroy the target, if possible. If the offensive advantage is endangered, the pilot of the engaged fighter should call in his wingman for help and disengage before becoming truly defensive. The engaged fighter-free fighter roles then reverse, and the engagement continues. Offensively the pilot of the free fighter should attempt to maintain a favorable position from which to attack the bogey if needed, but he should not engage until he is called in by the engaged pilot. The exception to this rule occurs when the engaged fighter becomes defensive. In this case the pilot of the free fighter is obligated to attack the bogey immediately, while the engaged fighter pilot does his best not to get shot.

The advantages of double attack doctrine over fighting wing doctrine are considerable. Offensively, it is much more efficient and effective to allow the fighters to split. The bracket attack can be absolutely devastat ing. In an engagement, the division of roles allows the engaged pilot more tactical latitude than he has in fighting wing. He does not have to be concerned with out-maneuvering his wingman and becoming separated. In addition, he is now free to use either angles or energy tactics as appropri ate. By using these methods, a pair of fighters can defeat even a more capable adversary. One pilot attacks the bogey, causing it to bleed energy, until he can no longer maintain an offensive advantage. Then the engaged pilot calls his wingman down to assume the attack and the cycle is repeated. The bogey is forced to fight each fighter in rapid succession and is denied an opportunity to regain lost energy. Meanwhile the free fighter is building energy for a fresh attack. Eventually the opponent is worn down in this manner until he no longer can successfully defend himself. His preoccupation with his current partner may also cause him to lose sight of the free fighter, resulting in a more effective unseen attack on the next cycle.

Defensively, double attack is also superior, particularly in a missiles environment. The wider cruise formations allowable provide better visual coverage of the vulnerable rear hemisphere and give the fighters more maneuvering room to support each other when they are attacked. Greater lateral and vertical separation between fighters also makes it less likely that both will be seen by an attacker. Also, since the wingman is not required to stay behind the leader once engaged, he can more comfortably maintain a line-abreast cruise formation, which provides better visual mutual support. Once the leader is engaged, the free-fighter pilot can be much more effective defensively, since less of his attention is required for maintaining position. The section's option to split when attacked makes it very difficult for a bogey to press an attack on one fighter without quickly being threatened by the other.

Double attack is not all roses, however. This doctrine requires more training, experience, and judgment on the part of the wingman than does fighting wing. Communications are also more critical, especially if the section has not fought together extensively. The lack or loss of a radio, or communications jamming, can hinder coordination and greatly reduce double attack effectiveness. Another possibility that must be considered in a hostile environment is the wild-card bogey. Two-versus-one engage ments can quickly become two-versus-two or two-versus-many. If the pilot of the free fighter is attacked and forced to defend himself, the engaged fighter may be left without support at a critical moment, resulting in two one-versus-one engagements. Because of the greater separation between the fighters and their widely varying directions of flight in double attack, it is considerably easier for hostile aircraft to split the section, breaking down the mutual support. For the same reasons, double attack carries a higher risk of the fighters becoming separated simply through loss of sight.

Although some double attack principles were used occasionally during World War I, the doctrine is generally considered to have been developed during the Spanish Civil War in the late 1930s by Werner Moelders of the German Condor Legion. The installation of radios in most German fighters, the increased difficulty of defending against high-speed attacks from the rear, and the necessity of engaging more maneuverable opponents led to use of the loose pair, which the Germans called the rotte. This doctrine provided the Luftwaffe with a considerable advantage over their foes early in World War II, but eventually it was accepted and employed to some extent by most of the Allied air forces, and it survives today as probably the most common air-to-air doctrine in use.

Loose Deuce

"Loose deuce" is the popular name of a tactical doctrine developed by the U.S. Navy during the Vietnam conflict. Rather than being an entirely new doctrine, loose deuce is actually a rather minor variation of double attack, but its use today is general enough that a discussion of loose deuce is warranted here.

Similarities with Double Attack

Like double attack, loose deuce is based on a loose, coordinated pair of fighters in mutual support. Pre-engaged philosophy and cruise formations are essentially identical in these two doctrines. Combat spread is probably the most common cruising formation, for all the reasons described earlier. A pre-engagement leader is designated, but once they are engaged the pilots revert to engaged fighter — free fighter roles.

Engaged Maneuvering

In offensive engaged maneuvering philosophy, however, the two doctrines diverge. The primary responsibility of the loose deuce free-fighter pilot is to position for his own attack on the bogey, rather than simply covering the engaged fighter. While the offensive double attack free-fighter pilot is primarily defensive, and awaits the engaged pilot's call before attacking, the loose deuce free-fighter pilot is not under any such restrictions. Each pilot is responsible for visually clearing his wingman and himself. The engaged pilot devotes most of his attention to offense, however, and the free pilot's duties are split about fifty-fifty between offense and defense.

The pilot of the engaged fighter in double attack doctrine fights the bogey one-versus-one until he destroys the target or he faces imminent loss of the offensive. Ideally, there should never be two fighters offensively engaged at the same time. One fighter pulls off the target before the other engages. This is not the case with loose deuce, as the free-fighter pilot constantly works for a favorable attack position and then strikes on his own. This may result in both fighters attacking the target simultaneously, but sustained offensive maneuvering against the same aircraft is to be avoided. Once the free-fighter pilot launches his attack the original en gaged pilot usually should disengage to rebuild energy and position for another attack.

Although the distinction between double attack and loose deuce may seem minor, it results in some major tactical differences. While in double attack doctrine the pilot of the engaged fighter is expected to get the kill while the free-fighter pilot stays out of his way and cheers, it is more often the free fighter that gets the shot in loose deuce. The engaged fighter sets up the kill by forcing or inducing the bogey to maneuver predictably, thereby making it easier for the free fighter to position for a shot.

In this scenario the engaged fighter has attained an offensive position in the bogey's rear hemisphere, but it is still beyond effective guns range (assume guns only). Double attack doctrine would call for pure and lead pursuit to close to guns range with proper lead for a high-deflection snap shot against the hard-turning target at time "T" (broken flight path). If this attack is unsuccessful, the engaged fighter will most likely overshoot and lose the offensive. The attacker will probably have bled considerable energy in this high-G attack, and he may even be in danger of becoming defensive if the bogey pilot decides to exploit the overshoot by reversing to initiate a flat or a rolling scissors. At the very least the high-angle, close range overshoot temporarily takes the pressure off the bogey, allowing the defender the option of reversing,unloading for acceleration, or diving away to escape before the free fighter can take up the attack.

Loose deuce doctrine would dictate a less aggressive approach to this situation. Rather than pulling for an immediate but low-percentage shot, the pilot of the engaged fighter employs pure and lag pursuit instead, to establish a commanding position deep in the bogey's rear hemisphere (solid flight path). By maintaining increased nose-tail separation with the defender at time "2," the engaged pilot avoids a serious overshoot, pre serves his energy, and achieves a temporary lag-pursuit position.

If the bogey pilot reverses after time "2," he subjects himself to a gun attack, as shown by the broken flight path to time "3'." He is therefore encouraged to continue turning in the original direction (solid flight path to time "3"), which makes him predictable for a longer period of time. This predictability may allow the free fighter to position for an unseen attack that is more effective and lethal. As a rule of thumb, the engaged fighter needs to force the adversary through about 360° of predictable turn in order to allow the free fighter a reasonable chance of success, especially when only RQ weapons are involved. Having accomplished this task, the en gaged fighter has served its purpose,- but if the engaged pilot allows the bogey to change its maneuver unpredictably (possibly because of a prema ture, unsuccessful attack), the free-fighter pilot's attack plan will be spoiled and the fight will be prolonged unnecessarily. The bogey may also be unpredictable if the engaged fighter does not apply sufficient pressure. The target must be threatened to the point where any significant change in its defensive maneuver will get it shot by the engaged fighter. Applying just the right amount of pressure is the engaged pilot's most critical duty. He should plan and execute the attack with the goal of maintaining this pressure as long as possible, and he should take only those shots which will allow him to maintain that pressure.

This technique has a very close analogy in basketball. The offensive ball handler can attempt to charge through the defense, taking whatever shot at the basket becomes available at the risk of throwing the ball up for grabs, or he can prosecute his charge only until his path is blocked, then pass off to his wide-open teammate for an easy basket. In double attack, the team mate (free fighter) positions for the offensive rebound, while in loose deuce he looks for an open shot. The ball handler (engaged fighter in loose deuce) sets up the shot by forcing the defense to concentrate on his play for the basket.

At time "1" in this scenario the fighters have bracketed the bogey, which is meeting the southern fighter head-on. The wingman, coming in from the north, has performed a lead turn and has a good offensive bite at the pass, forcing the bogey to turn hard left to defend. Since the pilot of the northern fighter is in the best position to apply pressure, he assumes the role of engaged fighter. Rather than attempting an immediate, high-angle attack, however, the engaged fighter avoids overshooting the defender's six o'clock by easing into a lag position at time "2," pushing the bogey around in a predictable left turn. A reversal by the bogey at this point would subject it to a gun attack by the engaged fighter.

Meanwhile the pilot of the free fighter pulls his nose up into a fairly steep zoom climb and extends straight ahead. Looking back over his shoulder at time "2," he has a nice view of the fight and can begin to plan his attack. The bogey is in a shallow oblique climbing left turn, and the engaged fighter is pushing it around the circle using lag pursuit in a low yo-yo. If this situation continues the engaged fighter will eventually pull to the inside of the bogey's turn in order to close the range and maintain offensive pressure. If the free-fighter pilot can attack from outside the target's turn, from its belly-side, he will have created a bracket. Therefore, the pilot of the free fighter plays his oblique turn between times "2" and "4" for a high-side gun attack from the bogey's belly-side at time "4." Such a well-planned, unseen attack should have a high probability of success.

Analysis of this engagement shows that the engaged fighter did a good job of maintaining offensive pressure on the bogey, occupying the de fender's attention and forcing a predictable turn through about 270°. This gave the free-fighter pilot the necessary time to project the bogey's flight path and position for an effective shot. The free fighter's pull-up at time "1" served several purposes. First of all the straight-ahead extension buys the free fighter some time until the flow of the fight can be determined. If the engaged fighter had overshot at time "2," and the bogey had reversed, the fight could have proceeded to the right instead of to the left as shown. By not committing himself to a left or a right turn immediately at the pass, the pilot of the free fighter has preserved the option of performing an oblique turn either left or right at time "2" to optimize his attack after the engagement has settled into a predictable pattern. The extension also gets the free fighter outside the horizontal bounds of the fight to facilitate a belly-side entry. In addition, extending away from the fight and zooming well up above the plane of the bogey's turn increases the chances that the opponent will lose sight of the free fighter. A small turn one way or the other between times "I" and "2" might be justified if the pilot of the free fighter can take advantage of the sun to mask his attack.

The free pilot's choice of a pull-up at time "1" could also be altered by the weapons available. Positioning above the fight is quite favorable for a gun attack, since the high-side attack offers somewhat greater margin for error and is practiced often. Missile armament, however, leads to other considerations. It might be preferable, for instance, to extend away in a dive at time "I," which would give the free fighter a more desirable look-up shot coming back into the fight, as well as generating more separation from the target for missile min-range considerations. Such a nose-low extension can also hamper the defender's visual problem by removing the free fighter from the bogey's altitude, and possibly by mask ing the aircraft against the terrain. For a RQ missile attack the free pilot should generally plan to attempt a belly-side entry and a launch as close as possible to 90° off the target's tail on the belly (cold) side. Although this high AOT is not strictly "rear quarter," it may be ideal for missile guidance if acquisition is possible at this aspect. An AAM launched on the target's belly-side tends to stay there through much of its flight, making it unlikely the target pilot will see it. As the target continues to turn away from the missile, more and more of a tail-on aspect is presented, which decreases track-crossing rate and improves fuzing in the end-game. Planning for a 90° AOT belly-side launch also provides more margin of error, since if the free-fighter pilot is a little late in positioning for the shot he should still have a good RQ firing opportunity.

Although counter-flow maneuvering is usually quicker, it is also more difficult. During the final stages of the attack (time "3" to time "4"), the fighters approach almost head-on with high closure and rapidly changing target aspect. These conditions make attack timing very critical and lead to a large number of missed shot opportunities. Although the in-flow attack takes longer, things are changing much more slowly in the final phase of the attack, so the approach can be less hurried, with easier timing and greater precision. Generally in-flow maneuvering results in greater separation for missile min-range considerations. Another factor here is maintaining sight of the fight. In this case the counter-flow turn allows the free-fighter pilot to watch the bogey through the entire maneuver. The in-flow option here would have required "kicking the fight across the tail," with added probability that visual contact would be lost, at least tempo rarily. This is not a general characteristic of in-flow maneuvering, how ever. In some situations counter-flow turns require pulling the bogey across the tail, so this consideration should be factored into free-fighter attack planning.

Engaged Fighter-Free Fighter Responsibilities

In summary, the primary responsibility of the pilot of the free fighter in loose deuce doctrine is to kill the bogey as quickly as possible, without placing himself in undue danger. Generally this goal is accomplished most effectively by keeping sight of the bogey, using the vertical plane, and maintaining a high energy level while maneuvering to the target's belly side. When convenient, environmental conditions should be exploited to mask the attack (i.e., sun or terrain masking). The free-fighter pilot's secondary responsibility is to maintain visual defensive coverage for him self and his wingman as protection against additional threat aircraft, SAMs, etc.

Analysis of Loose Deuce Doctrine

Loose deuce has some considerable advantages over other doctrines in the two-versus-one scenario. Use of the fighters in a shooter/shooter rela tionship, rather than in shooter/cover roles, as with double attack, results in much greater offensive efficiency. When a section is fighting a better turning opponent, double attack doctrine usually requires considerable time to wear down the bogey's energy before an effective firing position can be achieved. Loose deuce, on the other hand, can provide a shot opportunity much quicker, often within only one turn.

Although double attack might offer a more effective defense against unexpected threats in the two-versus-one nonsterile environment, in some cases the best offense truly may be the best defense. Lack of offensive efficiency in double attack doctrine, particularly when the fighters are opposing a better-turning bogey, prolongs the engagement unnecessarily, thereby subjecting the section to higher risk of attack. In many cases, especially in low- to medium-threat environments, loose deuce maneuver ing allows the section to terminate the engagement quickly and rejoin in a good defensive formation before coming under a second attack. A section using double attack doctrine would run a higher risk of being bounced by another bogey, but it probably would be better able to defend against such an attack. In a very high threat environment, however, when even a loose deuce section can expect to be jumped during a two-versus-one engage ment, double attack may be the doctrine of choice. Double attack also becomes more viable against a very inferior bogey aircraft or pilot, since the engagement can be terminated quickly.

Communications between fighters is essential for high effectiveness with either loose deuce or double attack. The engaged-fighter pilot in double attack should give the free-fighter pilot as much warning as possi ble before calling him in to assume the offensive role. Likewise, the free pilot may need to communicate defensive action to the engaged pilot in case of a second attack.

In loose deuce both fighters have defensive duties that require com munications. In addition, the engaged pilot should tell his wingman what he is trying to force the bogey to do and how effective he expects to be at this task. Meanwhile, the free-fighter pilot probably has a better picture of the overall situation and often can make the job easier by directing the engaged pilot to influence the bogey's turn in one direction or the other. Defensively this may mean that the engaged fighter drags the bogey in the best direction for the free fighter's position. Offensively the bogey's ma neuver can sometimes be influenced by intentional overshoots and by giving the bogey flight-path separation during a forward-quarter pass to induce a turn in the desired direction. All offensive directions by the free-fighter pilot to the engaged pilot are advisory only, however, and the engaged pilot should not follow any directions that would place him in unacceptable jeopardy.

Another situation calling for rapid communications is when the bogey pilot "switches" his attention from one fighter to the other. Such a switch usually demands a swap in engaged fighter—free fighter roles and should be called out instantly by whichever pilot first sees it. Loose deuce also leads to problems in clearly defining the free fighter-engaged fighter roles, since there are many instances when both fighters are attacking simultaneously. Generally it is the free pilot's responsibility to announce his attack and call for a role switch if he judges himself to be better positioned to assume the duties of engaged fighter. In cases where both fighters remain engaged for any period of time, offensive and defensive efficiency are both impaired. Neither pilot can provide effective defensive lookout in this situation. In addition, the two engaged fighters tend to drift toward the same piece of sky (generally inside the bogey's turn), where they are easy to see and can be fought as one aircraft, much like the situation with fighting wing doctrine. The fighters also tend to get in each other's way, and the danger of midair collisions increases. Double attack doctrine suffers fewer problems in role definition because responsibilities are more clearly divided.

Communications have always been a problem in air combat, and they probably always will be. Much attention is required in training to ensure timely, descriptive, and brief commentary. Personal call signs and stan dardized brevity codes should be used, and all transmissions by one pilot must be acknowledged by the other. In combat situations there may be hundreds of fighters in the area on the same radio frequency, which can render even essential communications virtually impossible. This situa tion should be avoided whenever possible by use of several different tacti cal frequencies (but all fighters in any local engagement area should be on the same frequency), and strict radio discipline must be observed.

Intentional comm-jamming might also be a fact of life in combat, and it is usually accomplished by broadcasting high-power noise on the oppo nent's tactical frequencies. Jam-resistant radios, very short transmissions, and frequent channel changes may offer some relief. Very low altitude operations may also enhance communications, as terrain may blank the enemy's ground-based jamming transmitters. Quite often two pilots in close proximity will be able to communicate adequately through the noise. This fact, and the somewhat reduced communications require ments of double attack, may favor this doctrine over loose deuce in heavy comm-jamming conditions. Either doctrine is still usable in this environ ment with practice, but reduced efficiency can be expected of both. Fight ing wing doctrine is probably least affected by comm-jamming (intentional or otherwise), but depending on the bogey aircraft, its weapons, and its pilot abilities, fighting wing may not be effective either offensively or defensively.

Some forms of nonverbal communications can also be useful in comm out or limited-comm conditions. In very close pre-engagement forma tions, hand signals may be used. In wider formations, coded movements of the leader's aircraft, such as rolls, short repetitive turns, or short climbs and dives, can be employed for signaling. Other visual signals, such as dumping a little fuel, jettisoning external fuel tanks, and creating burner puffs have also been used. During World War I, before installation of radios in fighters, even color-coded flare pistols were widely employed as signal ing devices.

The complexities of both double attack and loose deuce doctrine require a high degree of pilot training and experience to be effective. While the wingman in fighting wing doctrine has few responsibilities other than formation flying and defensive lookout, this is certainly not the case in the more advanced doctrines. Particularly with loose deuce, a high level of responsibility, skill, and judgment are required of both pilots. For greatest efficiency members of the section should constantly train, talk, eat, and sleep together. Each team member must know what the other is thinking, what he will do in various situations, his strengths and weaknesses. This intimate knowledge also serves to reduce some of the communication requirements in combat.

One-versus-Two Maneuvering

The foregoing discussions have demonstrated the power and effectiveness of two fighters operating in mutual support against a single adversary. But what about the other side of the coin? How can a single fighter survive and even prevail when outnumbered two-to-one? The answer is "Very care fully!" First of all the pilot of the singleton must realize when he is engaging two opponents that he has already broken one of the cardinal rules of air warfare: Do not engage without advantage. This sage piece of advice can be ignored only at great risk. In this case the singleton pilot is outnumbered, so he already has one strike against him and can ill afford another. He must weigh all the tactical factors carefully and attempt to optimize them in his favor.

Offensive Maneuvering

Surprise and offensive advantage are two of the most important factors to consider. The singleton pilot should stalk his victims carefully and attain a favorable position before committing to the attack. High in the section's rear hemisphere, out of the sun, is a favorite position. From such a perch the fighter may be able to dive on the section unseen, close quickly, and eliminate one of the bogeys before the section knows what hit it. If he has been successful and is still favorably positioned, the attacker may choose to take on the remaining bogey one-versus-one, or simply dive away and disengage at high speed. If the first attack is unsuccessful, the disengage ment option is usually called for. Depending on weapons and environ mental considerations, other attacks may also be viable or even preferable, but the high, diving approach has been most successful.

Following the initial attack on the wingman, the singleton pilot can assess the situation and decide whether to continue the attack on the leader (track 2) or break away and bolt for home (track 2'). Factors to be considered here are fuel state, the degree of surprise achieved, success of the first attack, and relative performance of the bogey aircraft and their weapons and pilots. Quite often an aggressively flown singleton achieving a surprise attack can so demoralize a hostile section that it completely forgets about its offensive potential and reacts only defensively.

The combat-spread or line-abreast formation normally offers the fighter section the best defensive lookout and maneuvering potential. Attacking a combat-spread section is therefore somewhat more difficult. Again, stalking the prey is in order to reach a favorable position before attacking. In this case there is no trailer to pick on, but some areas are generally more vulnerable than others. For instance, since the wing man's primary duties are to maintain position with his leader and visually cover the leader's rear hemisphere, this area is usually well defended. The leader, on the other hand, is often burdened with navigational and offen sive responsibilities and does not have to watch the wingman so closely to maintain position, so the wingman's rear hemisphere is normally less well guarded. Singling out the wingman in a combat-spread formation is not always easy, but, given a little observation time, the attacker can usually determine the wingman's aircraft as the fighter that maneuvers more radically in an apparent effort to scramble back into position after a section change in direction.

Quite often there will be some altitude split between the fighters, and typically the wingman will be the higher of the two, allowing himself some energy margin which can be useful for maintaining position during heavy maneuvering. When performing a diving attack, it is usually prefer able to hit the high bogey first, since it will take the low bogey longer to be a threat because of its lower energy level. Diving on the high bogey also allows the momentum of the attack to carry through the first target and down onto the second. Additionally, this technique prevents the attacker from ever being co-altitude with either bogey prior to the Attack, which reduces his chances of being seen. Bogey visual lookout is normally best in their altitude band.

The leader in most cases will be more experienced and more dangerous, and therefore he will be the more valuable target; but he is also likely to be harder to surprise. It is true that once the section leader has been elimi nated the wingman should be less effective as a single, making a double score easier to achieve. If this particular leader keeps losing wingmen, however, he will not be a leader very long, and he can be picked off after he has been demoted to wingman.

All else being equal, an attack from the right side of an enemy section is often most effective. This is because the usual right-handed cockpit con trol configuration of most fighter aircraft makes it more difficult for the pilot to twist around to the right than to the left for visual lookout. Defensive break turns to the right are also usually a little slower, for the same reason

When it is necessary to attack a section from below, the lower bogey is normally the target of choice. It must be recognized, however, that the higher bogey will have greater energy than the target and can become a threat much faster. A climbing attack normally should not be made unless the attacker can maintain a significant speed margin over the bogeys. Even so, the singleton pilot should not plan to stay with the low bogey for more than a quick, slashing attack before turning his attention to the high bogey.